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Primordial Violence: German War On The Soviet Partisans Cambridge University Press

In part 1 these essays are concerned with aspects of Soviet policy including political relations, Soviet perceptions of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the Soviet use of propaganda in the Third World. Part 2 is concerned with economic affairs, and the last section includes case-studies.

The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands

This research effort reviews the Soviet military's involvement in Afghanistan from four general, perspectives: (1) systemic problems inherent in the Soviet military culture, (2) the use of surprise, (3) operational maneuver and the preeminence of aviation and (4) employment of mines and chemical weapons as an extension of maneuver warfare. This paper concludes that the lessons of this war have been learned by the Russians. There is every reason to believe that they can achieve the level of doctrinal changes required to be successful in future "local" interventions. It must be accompanied, however, by corresponding socio-military reform. A Case Study of the Guerrilla Wars in

Lithuania and Western Ukraine, 1944-1953 Routledge

The aim of this thesis is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Soviet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. The thesis concludes that a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency evolved in spite of the absence of an official doctrine but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan may inspire changes in the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency. (KR). *Bibliography of Soviet Guerrilla Warfare and Soviet Underground Activities* DIANE Publishing

This bibliography is oriented toward guerrillas and guerrilla warfare as a weapon system used by the Soviet Army in fighting the Germans. While it relates basically to the tactics and techniques of Soviet guerrilla fighting during World War II, it was an element of a larger study designed to explore internal (revolutionary) was as an instrument and process of socio-political change.

Soviet Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 McFarland

The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract

international support for the insurgency. The Soviet Union invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979 intending to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state. Afghanistan's fledgling communist government lacked the legitimacy or strength to suppress the growing Mujahideen insurgency. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen as initially planned, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped Soviet 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Mujahideen quickly recognized the imprudence of engaging the Soviets conventionally, and embarked upon a guerrilla campaign that leveraged both internal and transnational sanctuary in order to rest, rearm, refit, train, receive medical attention, and recruit and organize reinforcements. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. Despite tactical innovations and the ad hoc development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the Soviets lacked the troop strength and composition necessary to eliminate internal Mujahideen sanctuary in the mountains, or to interdict transnational aid and sanctuary. Afghanistan's terrain was simply too rugged and difficult for the Soviet Union to rely on air interdiction and its relatively small counterinsurgency force to adequately deny physical sanctuary or infiltration routes within the country. Soviet efforts to deny internal sanctuary drove the Mujahideen across the border into

Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, Iran.

Cold War Lithuania Cambridge University Press

counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

The Soviet-Afghan War Cambridge University Press

This monograph examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979-1988) in terms of Soviet Army tactics and organization for combat. Throughout the decade of the 1970's, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. In the 1980's a re-evaluation of Soviet thinking occurred which saw greater flexibility at the operational and strategic levels. If the experience in Afghanistan has shown that set-piece tactics will not work in all types of warfare, and the Soviets are able to incorporate higher levels of initiative and flexibility into their tactical doctrine, then the U.S. may be required to refocus its training away from the stylized Soviet enemy. This study begins with a background discussion of Soviet historical involvement in Afghanistan to include counter-insurgency experience in their southwestern border area. It then covers the actual invasion and units employed with emphasis on their pre-deployment status and subsequent

performance. The following section divides the war into four phases to ease understanding. The monograph subsequently looks at lessons learned and principles reaffirmed from both the Soviet and U.S. perspective. A key feature is the need the Soviets apparently feel for Western style initiative and flexibility at lower command levels (battalion, company and platoon), and how this is inconsistent with their culture and system of command and control.

U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World Cass Military Studies

The rules of engagement in the third world are as structured as a ballet. This volume examines how US and Soviet foreign policies address Guerrilla warfare in the third world and gives a broad strategic analysis of low-intensity conflict objectives and constraints. Twenty-eight contributions. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The Intelligence Community's Record Free Press

Russia, like the United States, has experienced its struggles with counterinsurgency warfare. In Afghanistan, the Russian General Staff chose to approach the operation with a violently offensive mindset. This mindset prevented them from achieving their desired outcomes because they initially alienated the populace they needed to succeed. Then, when they realized their approach was not achieving the desired outcomes, they made only minor adjustments to their approach because they did not view this as a significant challenge to their military model. Then, when presented a similar situation in Chechnya, instead of approaching the operation using the lessons learned from Afghanistan, the General Staff chose to

use the same violent tactics employed during the invasion of Afghanistan. This monograph seeks to understand this phenomenon. This monograph is applicable to the United States in that it demonstrates that a nation must not become wedded to a specific approach in order to succeed in future war. During the post-Vietnam era, the United States chose to put aside the lessons learned from counterinsurgency warfare and focus on a comfortable and conventional form of warfare. It seems America is doing the same thing again with respect to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by focusing on evading such wars altogether.

Introduction * Research Question * Hypothesis * Methodology * Theoretical Approach * Development of Soviet and Russian Operational Art and Way of War * Development of Operational Art After the Russo-Japanese War * The Russian Way of War * Marxist-Leninism * World War Two, Stalin, and the Offense * North Atlantic Treaty Organization Expansion * Impact of Nuclear Weapons * Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia * Russian General Staff * Case Study: Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989 * Lead Up to War * Lead Up and Conduct of War * Lessons of War * Case Study: First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996, 1999-2010) * First Chechen War (1994-96) * Lessons of the First Chechen War * Second Chechen War (1999 - 2010) * Lessons of the Second Chechen War * Conclusion

Soviet Counterinsurgency Pickle Partners Publishing

[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-

Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.

Protracted Warfare RAND Corporation
This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counterinsurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells

only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan
GRIN Verlag

The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The development of these central themes should contribute to the secondary goals of the paper; first, to establish a fuller basis of comparison than is currently used in examination of Soviet and Soviet-advised counterinsurgent campaigns, and second, to add some historical depth to the developing body of work on Soviet counterinsurgency. This should allow for some useful generalizations about the Soviet approach to counterinsurgent warfare to be derived. Counterinsurgency became a

preoccupation of the U.S. military during the late fifties and early sixties. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam sustained interest in counterinsurgency and new challenges to U.S. interests in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have renewed attention to issues of counterinsurgency in the eighties. Although the insurgents (primarily the Central Asian Basmachi), and comparative surveys of the counterinsurgency campaigns of the Soviets in Afghanistan and various Soviet allies fighting insurgents since 1975. For the purpose of establishing the patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency the limited number of cases in the first two approaches is too narrow. Although the third approach examines more cases, it mixes dissimilar cases and blurs distinctions between Soviet methods of counterinsurgency and the methods of Soviet advised militaries fighting insurgencies.

[A Comparison of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan](#) Pickle Partners Publishing

Analysing policy documents from nine counterinsurgency wars, Elias asks why powerful militaries have difficulty managing local partners. Revealing a critical political dynamic in military interventions, this book will appeal to academics and policymakers addressing counterinsurgency issues in foreign policy, security studies and political science.

Echoes of the Past Pickle Partners Publishing

This book investigates the Soviet response to nationalist insurgencies between 1944 and 1953 in the regions the Soviet Union annexed after the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Pickle Partners Publishing

This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

A Study Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Incorporated

In terms of Clausewitz' paradoxical trinity, the German counter insurgency in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union 1941-1944, did not achieve a sense of balance. The second two legs of the trinity, the play of chance and probability and the element of subordination, were subverted by primordial violence and enmity. Clausewitz offers his paradoxical trinity as a viable framework for analyzing the

inherent complexities of warfare. The three interdependent, dynamic aspects of the trinity must be balanced against each other if a successful plan for war is to prevail. Additionally, Clausewitz addresses the dynamics of insurgencies and counter insurgencies. With these two analytical frameworks, an examination of a specific campaign becomes plausible. The German efforts to thwart the partisan uprising in the occupied territories of the Eastern Front from 1941-1944 reflected the interplay of the Clausewitz triad. Primordial violence was imbued in the German people as a result of National Socialist indoctrination. The play of chance and probability reflected the largely successful active and passive measures employed by the German armed forces behind German lines in the east. The element of subordination was manifested in the pernicious Nazi policies and directives that inevitably dictated the conduct of the armed forces. As a result of Hitler's imbalanced, irrational eastern strategy and sequent war on the partisans, primordial violence, enmity, and hatred superseded the other two legs of the trinity. Hitler's unlimited political and military objectives ultimately were incompatible with the German Army's ability to pragmatically prosecute the eastern war and pacify the population that supported the partisan resistance.

Comparing Soviet and US Counterinsurgency Doctrine & Strategy in Afghanistan Harvard University Press

In December, 1979 the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan and has been involved in a counterinsurgency ever since. This study looks at one aspect of that conflict, Soviet airpower. Using the case study format it examines some doctrinal tenets

that drive the Soviet's use of airpower and specifically how they are employing their assets in Afghanistan. By viewing their tactics and choices of weapons, Western observers can learn a great deal about the Soviet military's capabilities. The study concludes with some of the lessons that have emerged from this conflict.

Imperial Russian and Early Soviet Population-Centric Counterinsurgency - Caucasian War and Bolshevik Suppression of Basmachi Rebellion (1919-1933) Pickle Partners Publishing

The transition from the Soviet to the post-1991 Russian military is a fascinating story of decline and reinvention. The Soviet army suffered a slow demise, dissolving in 2000 and only gradually reforming based on radically different principles. The First Chechnya War (1994-1996) was the lowest point for the Soviet military but the Second Chechnya War (1999-2004) saw the initial stirrings of the new Russian army. The Five Day War with Georgia in August 2008 was its first major success and marked Russia's return to world power status. Lively accounts and maps describe the actions of these wars, along with the Crimea operation of 2014, the separatist struggles in eastern Ukraine and the ongoing Russian intervention in Syria.

Post-Soviet Decline and Rebuilding, 1992-2018

This project analyzes the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from April of 2002 to December of 2007 and why the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. This research aims to show that the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union due to the strategy and organization of the U.S.

military and the harsh terrain of Afghanistan itself. The Soviet Union's initial strategy utilized a relatively small commitment. The strategy allowed the military to organize in such a way to hold the infrastructure of the country but not the rural areas where the Mujahideen operated. The harsh terrain of Afghanistan made operating in and controlling the rural areas very difficult. As such, the insurgents were able to control the rural areas and population and force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The initial strategy of the U.S. military was one which committed a very small amount of troops, less than 3000. This limited number of troops influenced the organization of the military to hold on to key infrastructure in the country but did not allow the U.S. to spread its control to the country side. The rough terrain of Afghanistan provided insurgent fighters safe havens while also hampering U.S. efforts to operate outside of the cities and control the rural areas. Together the three variables help show why the war in Afghanistan deteriorated and why similar mistakes were made.

Russian Organizational Learning in the Context of the Afghanistan and Chechnya Counterinsurgencies - Soviet Military History, Operational Art, World War II, Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia

Nearly eight years since initiating combat operations in Afghanistan, the United States and our allies are witnessing first-hand the difficulty of denying sanctuary to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Similar to the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War, today's insurgents are leveraging mountainous terrain and international borders to survive against a superpower's counterinsurgency efforts. As the United States prepares to shift

focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, it behooves us to incorporate lessons learned from the Soviet-Afghan War in order to adequately shape our force and equipment, evolve counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine, and integrate the elements of national power to deny insurgent sanctuary. I chose to study the Soviet efforts to deny the Mujahideen sanctuary because I believe sanctuary denial is a critical requirement for our success in the current fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Soviet Union did not anticipate a decade-long counterinsurgency fight against the Mujahideen when it invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979. Determined to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state, the Soviet Union conducted a coup de main modeled after successful interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The Soviet leadership believed that "...the mere presence of Soviet forces would serve to 'sober up' the Mujahideen..." and enable the DRA's communist government to suppress the insurgency. Failing to appreciate the will of the Mujahideen to resist foreign invaders, the Soviets miscalculated the nature of the war into which they entered. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to

the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract international support for the insurgency. PREFACE * INTRODUCTION * SANCTUARY DEFINED * GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT * DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURE * BACKGROUND * POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE 1970s * SOVIET

COMBAT OPERATIONS * INADEQUATE FORCE TO DENY SANCTUARY * COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN * CONCLUSIONS * NOTES * APPENDIX A - AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS * APPENDIX B - AFGHANISTAN 3-D RELIEF MAP * APPENDIX C - MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN * BIBLIOGRAPHY

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