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# Bombing To Win Air Power And Coercion In War Cornell Studies In Security Affairs 1st Edition By Pape Robert A 1996 Paperback

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Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History  
Airpower in Three Wars  
The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era  
The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It  
The Bombing War  
The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War  
Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States  
Europe, 1939-1945  
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Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare  
Von Pape "On Airpower" Meets "Airpower for Dummies"  
Billy Mitchell's War with the Navy  
The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force  
Air Power and the Gulf War  
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism  
The Age of Airpower  
Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II  
Fighting Talk  
Military Aviation and American Popular Culture After World War II

Learning Large Lessons  
Bombing to Win  
Cheap Threats  
A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War

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## VAUGHAN RAY

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*Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History* Georgetown University Press

In the years following WWI, the U.S. Congress was more interested in disarmament than in funding national defense. For the military services this meant lean budgets and skeleton operating forces. Billy Mitchell's War recounts the struggle between the Army and Navy air arms for the resources needed to define and establish the role of aviation within their respective services in the period between the two world wars. When Billy Mitchell returned from WW I, he brought with him the deep-seated belief that air power had made armies and navies obsolete. When Congress rejected the concept of a unified air service in 1920, Mitchell and his supporters turned on the Navy, seeking to substitute the Air Service as the nation's first line of defense. While Mitchell proved that aircraft could sink a battleship with the bombing of the Ostfriesland in 1921, he was unable to convince the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or Congress of the need for an independent air force. When Mitchell turned to the pen to discredit the Navy, he was convicted by his own words and actions in a court-martial that captivated the nation, and was forced to resign in 1925. Rather than ending the rivalry for air power, Mitchell's resignation set the stage for the ongoing dispute between the two services in the years immediately before WWII.

*Airpower in Three Wars* Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Throughout this first century of air power, military theorists have proposed numerous schemes as the best use of air power. Airmen of many nations tried and tested these theories in wars large and small and they have learned, ignored, or forgotten many lessons. Of the four major coercive mechanisms available to air power-punishment, risk, military denial and decapitation-Robert Pape in *Bombing to Win*, concludes that military denial is the best use of air power. Furthermore, Pape argues that recent technological advances only enhance the military denial mechanism. In his appendix, Pape categorizes the Italian case as another case of successful military denial. This study examines the collapse of Italy in 1943 and the contribution of air power to this collapse. Several broad works, often citing Ernest May in "Lessons" from the Past, claim that air power decisively caused the Italian surrender, but do not indisputably argue this point nor do they define the coercive mechanism(s) air power employed to achieve this result. Studies such as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey or the British Bombing Survey Unit largely ignore Italy or in the case of F. W. Deakin's *The Brutal Friendship*, cite the coalition politics as the primary cause of Italy's surrender... In an era of clean conflict, both painless and quick, leaders and airman downplay the psychological effects of air

power-with the exception of the questionable negative effects of casualties on the democracies. Operation DESERT STORM typifies both these effects. Furthermore, attrition-based computer wargame simulations largely ignore the human element. The collapse of Italy serves as one example where the psychological effects of air power outweighed the physical damage caused by bombing. **The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era** University of Alabama Press

Filling a substantial void in our understanding of the history of airpower in Vietnam, this book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam. Most important for understanding the US defeat, Laslie illustrates the perils of a nation building a one-dimensional fighting force capable of supporting only one type of war.

*The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* Random House Trade Paperbacks  
Maxims and essays that encapsulate timeless insights on strategy

*The Bombing War* Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War

"The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications...but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war." Colin Powell  
Colin Powell, *My American Journey* Since its original publication *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.

*The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War* Pickle Partners Publishing

Director and producer Tim Burton impresses audiences with stunning visuals, sinister fantasy worlds, and characters whose personalities are strange and yet familiar. Drawing inspiration from sources as varied as Lewis Carroll, Salvador Dalí, Washington Irving, and Dr. Seuss, Burton's creations frequently elicit both alarm and wonder. Whether crafting an offbeat animated feature, a box-office hit, a collection of short fiction, or an art exhibition, Burton pushes the envelope, and he has emerged as a powerful force in contemporary popular culture. In *The Philosophy of Tim Burton*, a distinguished group of scholars examines the philosophical underpinnings and significance of the director's oeuvre, investigating films such as *Batman* (1989), *Edward Scissorhands* (1990), *The Nightmare before Christmas* (1993), *Sleepy Hollow* (1999), *Big Fish* (2003), *Sweeney Todd* (2007), *Alice in Wonderland* (2010), and *Dark Shadows* (2012). The essays in this volume explore Burton's

distinctive style, often disturbing content, and popular appeal through three thematic lenses: identity, views on authority, and aesthetic vision. Covering topics ranging from Burton's fascination with Victorian ideals, to his celebration of childhood, to his personal expression of the fantastic, the contributors highlight the filmmaker's peculiar narrative style and his use of unreal settings to prompt heightened awareness of the world we inhabit. The Philosophy of Tim Burton offers a penetrating and provocative look at one of Hollywood's most influential auteurs.

Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States Harvard University Press

Includes a new Afterword Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award One of the world's foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In *Dying to Win*, Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers—and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi'ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II's Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history. *Dying to Win* is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11. "Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants." –Michael Scheuer, author of *Imperial Hubris* "Provocative . . . Pape wants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise." –Henry Schuster, CNN.com "Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East." –The Washington Post Book World "Brilliant." –Peter Bergen, author of *Holy War, Inc.*

**Europe, 1939-1945** U.S. Government Printing Office

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.

*Bring the War Home* Modern War Studies (Hardcover)

The ultimate history of the Blitz and bombing in the Second World War, from Wolfson Prize-winning historian and author Richard Overy The use of massive fleets of bombers to kill and terrorize civilians was an aspect of the Second World War which continues to challenge the idea that Allies specifically fought a 'moral' war. For Britain, bombing became perhaps its principal contribution to the fighting as, night after night, exceptionally brave men flew over occupied Europe destroying its

cities. *The Bombing War* radically overhauls our understanding of the War. It is the first book to examine seriously not just the most well-known parts of the campaign, but the significance of bombing on many other fronts - the German use of bombers on the Eastern Front for example (as well as much newly discovered material on the more familiar 'Blitz' on Britain), or the Allied campaigns against Italian cities. The result is the author's masterpiece - a rich, gripping, picture of the Second World War and the terrible military, technological and ethical issues that relentlessly drove all its participants into an abyss. Reviews: 'Magnificent ... must now be regarded as the standard work on the bombing war ... It is probably the most important book published on the history of the second world war this century' Richard J Evans, *Guardian* 'Monumental ... this is a major contribution to one of the most controversial aspects of the Second World War ... full of new detail and perspectives ... hugely impressive' James Holland, *Literary Review* 'This tremendous book does what the war it describes signally failed to do. With a well-thought-out strategy and precision, it delivers maximum force on its objectives ... The result is a masterpiece of the historian's art' *The Times* 'It is unlikely that a work of this scale, scope and merit will be surpassed' *Times Higher Education* 'What distinguishes Mr Overy's account of the bombing war from lesser efforts is the wealth of narrative detail and analytical rigour that he brings to bear' *Economist* 'Excellent ... Overy is never less than an erudite and clear-eyed guide whose research is impeccable and whose conclusions appear sensible and convincing even when they run against the established trends' *Financial Times* 'Hard to surpass. If you want to know how bombing worked, what it did and what it meant, this is the book to read' *Times Literary Supplement* About the author: Richard Overy is the author of a series of remarkable books on the Second World War and the wider disasters of the twentieth century. *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia* won both the Wolfson Prize for History and the Hessel-Tiltman Prize. He is Professor of History at the University of Exeter. Penguin publishes *1939: Countdown to War, The Morbid Age, Russia's War, Interrogations, The Battle of Britain and The Dictators*. He lives in London.

Setup Cornell University Press

This paper will present a comparative review of two books both intended to describe successful methods for employing air power. Despite the similar goal, the books are designed for different audiences. Pape's, *Bombing to Win*, while informative to policymakers, is intended as a first step for social scientists to begin the study of the use of military coercion. Warden's, on the other hand, is aimed primarily at those who will be in a position to plan and conduct an air campaign. Both books rely heavily on information from secondary sources, but their approach to the issues varies greatly. Pape presents his theory of coercion and examines case studies from the use of air power in the 20th century to support that theory. Warden uses historical information as well, but his approach is to describe the roles of air power and provide guidelines on how to use them. Despite the two different audiences and methods, if one looks closely, both books come to some surprisingly similar conclusions. Conversely, they have some starkly contrasting views as well. Warden is clearly a proponent of air power and sees its utility in many different uses. Conversely, Pape sees the only valid use of air power as being attacks on fielded forces and vehemently defends that position. Now, turning to the books individually to examine their arguments in more detail.

Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign 1989-1991 Naval Institute Press

Air University is proud to have joined the Air Staff and the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in sponsoring the April 1991 conference on aerospace challenges and missions that produced this collection of essays. Written by a distinguished group of specialists from academia, the military, government, business, and the media, these essays examine American national security policy and Air Force issues from a variety of perspectives. Aside from their remarkable perceptiveness, the contributions of the authors are especially timely because they address the pivotal role of air power in the war with Iraq. The essays leave no doubt that the employment of both established and innovative methods of air combat in that crisis has important implications for the global-security environment of the future. In that sense, this book provides a foundation for evaluating the complex policy challenges that we face in the 1990s and into the next century." Charles G. Boyd, Lieutenant General, United States Air Force, Commander, Air University

A Comparative Review of Robert Pape's "Bombing to Win" and John Warden III's "Air Campaign"  
Smithsonian Institution

Airpower, more than any other factor, has shaped war in the twentieth century. In this fascinating narrative history, Martin van Creveld vividly portrays the rise of the plane as a tool of war and the evolution of both technology and strategy. He documents seminal battles and turning points, and relates stories of individual daring and collective mastery of the skies. However, the end of airpower's glorious age is drawing near. The conventional wisdom to the contrary, modern precision guided munitions have not made fighter bombers more effective against many kinds of targets than their predecessors in World War II. U.S. ground troops calling for air support in Iraq in 2003 did not receive it any faster than Allied forces did in France in 1944. And from its origins on, airpower has never been very effective against terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents. As the warfare waged by these kinds of people grows in importance, and as ballistic missiles, satellites, cruise missiles and drones increasingly take the place of quarter-billion-dollar manned combat aircraft and their multi-million-dollar pilots, airpower is losing utility almost day by day.

*The Bomber Mafia* Texas A&M University Press

A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on—and gained validity from—widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining

narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas—not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.

*Airpower* Princeton University Press

Why do weak states resist threats of force from the United States, especially when history shows that this superpower carries out its ultimatums? *Cheap Threats* upends conventional notions of power politics and challenges assumptions about the use of compelling military threats in international politics. Drawing on an original dataset of US compellence from 1945 to 2007 and four in-depth case studies—the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 2011 confrontation with Libya, and the 1991 and 2003 showdowns with Iraq—Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain finds that US compelling threats often fail because threatening and using force became comparatively “cheap” for the United States after the Cold War. Becoming the world’s only superpower and adopting a new light-footprint model of war, which relied heavily on airpower and now drones, have reduced the political, economic, and human costs that US policymakers face when they go to war. Paradoxically, this lower-cost model of war has cheapened US threats and fails to signal to opponents that the United States is resolved to bear the high costs of a protracted conflict. The result: small states gamble, often unwisely, that the United States will move on to a new target before achieving its goals. *Cheap Threats* resets the bar for scholars and planners grappling with questions of state resolve, hegemonic stability, effective coercion, and other issues pertinent in this new era of US warfighting and diplomacy.

**Air Power and Coercion in War** Cornell University Press

Airpower, especially strategic bombing, frequently generates controversy. Ever since the US Army bought its first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of airpower. These debates continue despite (or perhaps because of) the hundreds of books that have been written on the subject and the scores of examples witnessed. As the saying goes, certain topics tend to produce more heat than they do light. In some cases, the questions regarding airpower, strategic bombing, and their roles in war remain unanswerable—or at least people fail to agree on the answers. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen approach war from different viewpoints and with differing service-cultural perspectives, which similarly influence others who write and speak about war. This is natural and perhaps advantageous—fresh ideas are always useful. Unfortunately, much of the debate regarding airpower and strategic bombing has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing—and certainly there are times when criticism is appropriate—it must be based on accurate information. What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts.

**Within Limits** Penguin UK

The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power have shifted since the end of the Cold War. At the level of major operations and campaigns, the Air Force has proved capable of and committed to performing deep strike operations, which the Army long had believed the Air Force could not reliably

accomplish. If air power can largely supplant Army systems in deep operations, the implications for both joint doctrine and service capabilities would be significant. To assess the shift of these roles, the author of this report analyzed post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This revised edition includes updates and an index.

[Selling Air Power](#) Cornell University Press

The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded. He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of "hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and used that growth to secure its position in the defense establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict—a position that left it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations.

[Dying to Win](#) Independently Published

In this monograph, Tami Davis Biddle analyzes the historical record of air power over the past 100 years. Her monograph, designed for the student of strategy, is intended to provide both a concise introduction to the topic and a framework for thinking intelligently about air power, particularly

aerial bombing. Her primary aim is to discern the distinction between what has been expected of air power by theorists and military institutions, and what it has produced in the crucible of war. Aerial bombing, Biddle argues, is a coercive activity in which an attacker seeks to structure the enemy's incentives—using threats and actions to shape and constrain the enemy's options, both perceived and real. It is an important and much-utilized military instrument for both deterrence and compellence. In addition, it is a powerful tool in the arsenal of the joint warfighter. Its ability to achieve anticipated results, however, varies with circumstances. Students of strategy must be able to discern and understand the conditions under which aerial bombing is more or less likely to achieve the results expected of it by those who employ it.

[The Command of the Air](#) Routledge

Coercion—the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior—is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power—or any other military instrument—will probably fail to coerce.

Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.

[Cutting the Fuse](#) CreateSpace

An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.

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